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Made in Italy (by the Chinese): Economic 
Restructuring and the Politics of Migration 
Calvin Chen 
Mount Holyoke College 
Resumen 
Personas de todo el mundo se desplazan y establecen en lugares nuevos e 
inesperados.En Prato, Italia, los inmigrantes chinos dirigen la mayoría de 
las empresas de confección textil de la ciudad e incluso subcontratan la 
confección de famosos diseñadores como Giorgio Armani o Dolce & 
Gabbana. Los productos italianos, antaño fabricados por trabajadores 
italianos, ahora cada vez están más hechos... ¡por chinos! Este desarrollo 
es el resultado de una extraordinaria sincronía entre su propia perspectiva 
empresarial y la estructura de producción local italiana a pequeña escala y 
basada en la familia. En definitiva, los chinos prosperan porque se adaptan 
bien al tipo de producción y a la demanda de la industria italiana. 
Palabras clave 
Migración china, Italia, empresa familiar china, talleres confección. 
Abstract 
People around the world are on the move and settling in new, unexpected 
places. In Prato, Italy, Chinese immigrants now run most of the city’s 
textiles-apparel companies and even subcontract for such leading 
designers as Giorgio Armani and Dolce & Gabbana. Italian products once 
made by Italian workers are now increasingly made…by the Chinese! I 
argue that this development resulted from an uncanny synchronicity 
between their business approach and the demands of Italy’s local, family-
based, small-batch production environment. In other words, the Chinese 
thrived because they fit in well with the unique makeup and demands of 
Italian industry. 
Key words 
Chinese migration, Italy, Chinese family business, garment industry.
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POLITICS OF MIGRATION 
Calvin Chen 
Mount Holyoke College 
International migration hardly seems novel anymore. In the 
post-World War II era especially, people have been 
increasingly on the move, crisscrossing the globe and settling in 
new, even unexpected places. Prato, Italy, a city located eleven 
miles from its famous neighbor Florence, is an extraordinary 
case in point. Today, a visitor can walk down Via Pistoiese on 
the city’s west side and hear nothing but Chinese being spoken 
and patronize a seemingly endless line of Chinese-owned 
stores. In one of the city’s industrial districts (macrolotto 
industriale), that same visitor would find an equally stunning 
development: Chinese owners, once apprentices and workers, 
running the vast majority of the textiles-apparel companies 
based there and even subcontracting for such leading design 
houses as Giorgio Armani and Dolce & Gabbana. Italian 
products once made by migrants from Italy’s South are now 
increasingly made…by the Chinese! A generation ago, such an 
outcome would have been unimaginable. 
Not surprisingly, there is considerable disagreement over what 
all this means for Italy’s future. Clearly, Chinese entry into 
these sectors has reinvigorated industries that were once in the 
throes of a slow but undeniable decline. At the same time, the 
rapid ascent of the Chinese, coupled with limited 
understandings of them as individuals and as a community, has 
prompted growing concerns among native Italians that 
continued Chinese success may undermine the country’s 
economy and even its way of life. Roberto Saviano’s popular 
novel Gomorra offers a dramatic manifestation of this anxiety. 
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His characterization of the Chinese as accomplices, even active 
partners of the Italian mafia in criminal activity provides a 
facile explanation for the decline requires aggressive action 
against the Chinese and other migrants, who collectively 
embody the “other.”1 
This sense of unease was crucial in the return of current Prime 
Minister Silvio Berlusconi to political prominence as well as 
the growing influence of a key political party, the Northern 
League (Lega Nord). Determined to fulfill its campaign 
promises and curtail the perceived ills of migration, the 
Berlusconi-led government initiated police sweeps in the 
country’s major metropolises in April 2008. Such actions 
quickly cascaded into vigilante action against the Roma 
community near Naples and in early 2010, military-style raids 
on Prato’s Chinese-owned businesses after local elections 
installed a center-right administration in the city for the first 
time in 63 years. 2  The crackdown traumatized the Chinese 
community to such a degree that “newspapers reported that 
China’s consul-general in nearby Florence compared the raids 
with the Nazi SS.”3  This unprecedented denunciation was a 
remarkable break from previous Chinese pronouncements and 
signaled the Chinese government’s grave concern that its 
nationals had become scapegoats for Italy’s domestic 
difficulties. Despite this strong response, the raids have 
                                                 
1  See Roberto Saviano, Gomorrah, translated by Virginia Jewiss (New 
York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2007), especially pp. 3-37. 
2 Elizabeth Rosenthal, “Italy Arrests Hundreds of Immigrants,” New York 
Times, 16 May 2008.  
3 Guy Dinmore, “Tuscan Town Turns Against Chinese Migrants”, Financial 
Times, 8 February 2010. 
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continued unabated, engendering new fears and resentment 
among Chinese and Italians alike. 
While security is undoubtedly a serious and legitimate concern, 
studying Chinese migrants solely in these terms reduces them to 
one-dimensional caricatures, inscrutable on the one hand and 
subversive on the other. Such an approach misses fundamental 
aspects of who they are – their complex histories and identities – 
that are essential to understanding their roles in a changing Italy. 
To me, the Chinese are multidimensional, purposeful actors 
animated by the same forces that motivate all people: love of 
family, a desire for financial security, pride, and the hope that 
their children will one day lead happier lives than they have. 
Hence, this article adopts a different and more expansive 
approach towards understanding the Chinese in contemporary 
Italy. I begin with an analysis of the broader structural changes 
that took place in Italy and China over the last 30 years and 
show how they combined to open up an unprecedented 
economic opportunity for the Chinese. Within this larger 
context, I move to a micro-level analysis of the Chinese and 
their work experiences. Drawing upon participant observation 
and personal interviews conducted with 74 respondents in Italy 
from 2007-2010, I provide a “thick description” of the 
economic challenges and constraints the Chinese face, the 
strategies they use to overcome them, and how their success has 
fueled further adaptation.4 
                                                 
4 Although most of the interviews were conducted in Prato, I also draw upon 
testimony collected in Bologna, Milan, Florence, and Venice. Clifford 
Geertz coined the term “thick description.” See The Interpretation of 
Cultures: Selected Essays (New York: Basic Books, 1973). 
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My research suggests that the Chinese have done well for 
reasons not emphasized in similar studies. In contrast to those 
analyses, I argue that the stunning economic success of the 
Chinese in Italy results from an uncanny synchronicity between 
their business approach and the demands of Italy’s local, 
family-based, small-batch production environment rather than 
incompatibility between the two. In other words, the Chinese 
thrived because their individual and collective profiles as well 
as their work orientation actually resonated with the unique 
makeup and demands of Italian industry. This overlap 
eventually allowed the Chinese to utilize their kinship and 
native-place networks for economic advance: the “social 
capital” contained in these relationships supplied the requisite 
information (on fashion trends in particular), money, and labor 
for them to compete and eventually thrive in alien 
surroundings. 5  They turned out to be an excellent fit for a 
highly turbulent situation. 
Prelude to Breakthrough 
At the macro-level, the success of the Chinese in Italy can be 
generally traced to the confluence of several developments. The 
restructuring of the Italian textiles-apparel industry, Italy’s 
demographic shift and inconsistent immigration policies, 
coupled with China’s post-Mao reforms and reintegration into 
the global economy, decisively upended entrenched practices 
and created new complementarities between a migrant-
receiving Italy and a migrant-sending China. The result was 
                                                 
5 The term “social capital” was largely popularized by Robert Putnam. See 
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 2000) and Making Democracy Work: Civic 
Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). 
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simply a perfect but accidental storm that created new openings 
for the Chinese to break through. 
It is sometimes easy to forget that well before the arrival of the 
Chinese in Italy during the 1980s, the Italian textile-apparel 
industry was world-famous for its competitiveness and flair. 
Since the nineteenth century, Prato has been home to some of 
the country’s leading producers, especially of woolens. As 
Michael Piore and Charles Sabel (1984: 214) observe, Pratesi 
firms were competitive against international (especially British) 
and domestic rivals alike. Capitalizing on comparatively lower 
wages, these companies eventually grew into large, vertically 
integrated enterprises. As Japanese and East European 
challengers began entering the market in the 1950s, producers 
in Prato introduced innovations like tessuti fantasia, “‘fantasy’ 
fabrics, woven ofdifferent-colored reconstituted threats, 
combined according to the designer’s imagination and fashion’s 
whims,” (ibid, 214) to stay one step ahead of their new 
competitors. Even so, Pratesi manufacturers could not evade 
the immense financial and structural pressures that bore down 
on them and other textile-apparel producers in the post-war 
period. Richard Locke (1995: 137-138) summarizes the 
situation this way: 
As a result of changing conditions of international competition, increased 
labor costs and rigidities, higher energy and raw material costs, more 
restrictive government environmental and safety regulations, and altered 
consumer tastes, the industry’s traditional model of economic 
development -- based on low-wage, semiskilled workers producing large 
series of low-to-medium quality standardize goods and integrated mills -
- was rendered inefficient and obsolete in both Western Europe and the 
United States. 
The large Pratesi firms, which at one point employed nearly 
80% of all employees working in the textile sector, responded 
by downsizing: they laid off workers and either sold orrented 
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them equipment, effectively turning them into subcontractors. 
By the 1970s, the textilesapparel sector in Prato had been 
radically reconfigured into a more fragmented, batch 
production-oriented industrial structure dominated by small, 
often family-run shops (Locke, 1995: 214-215). However, this 
resulting flexible specialization came at a high price. Richard 
Locke (1995: 144-145) contends that while individual Pratesi 
firms were more exposed than ever to the vagaries of the 
market, they did not have strong, relatively egalitarian 
associational networks to rely upon for advice, assistance, or 
resources. Put another way, Prato lacked the social ties and the 
social capital that could have enhanced the ability of producers 
to better understand and take advantage of emerging market 
trends). 6  These small companies were left to fend for 
themselves in an increasingly competitive world. 
Compounding these changes is an often underemphasized 
development, Italy’s demographic shift. In the post-war period, 
Italy, like the rest of Western Europe, experienced not only 
declines in total fertility rates, but also a considerable aging of its 
population. In other words, Italians “were living longer and 
having fewer children”(Demeny, 2006: 41). The immediate and 
practical consequence of this trend was diminishing numbers: 
there were simply fewer potential replacements for the young, 
southern Italians who had moved north to power Italian factories 
during the 1960s and 1970s. Moreover, young Italians who could 
have followed in their parents’ footsteps and joined the textiles 
industry, for example, increasingly aspired to and also possessed 
the means to pursue more professional careers. For them, Italy 
                                                 
6 Others disagree with Locke’s assessment. Paul Ginsborg, for instance, 
maintains that the Italian textile industry remained highly competitive in the 
global marketplace. See Ginsborg, Italy and Its Discontents: Family, Civil 
Society, State 1980-2001 (2006: 3). 
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was “a land of opportunity; not…on the level of the ‘make good’ 
societies such as the USA and Australia, but certainly more so 
than many other European societies” (Ginsborg, 2006:32). They 
saw upward mobility as natural and inevitable. Thus, as 
Antonella Ceccagno notes, “opportunities for a low-skilled 
labour force opened for new migrants,” especially in the 
specialized, small, local businesses that dominated towns like 
Prato (Ceccagno, 2003: 188). 
Still, given that the non-Italians initially seeking to enter Italy 
were predominantly European and relatively modest in number, 
Italian officials were not ready or resolved to implement a 
comprehensive plan for managing migrants. As Stefano Allievi 
points out, “In 1970, permits of stay issued to foreigners 
numbered 146,989; in 1975, they were 185,715; but by 1980 
and number had reached 298,749” (Allevi, 2010: 149-150). By 
1986 though, continuing growth in the immigrant population 
forced the Italian Parliament to finally acknowledge the need 
for clearer regulations and pass Law 943, also known as Legge 
Foshi. Although this was a critical first step, its casting of 
migrants as “extracommunitarian” laborers only rather than 
potential citizens limited its scope and effectiveness (ibid, 152-
153). 7  Each successive law concerning migration, from the 
Martelli Decree of 1990 to the Turco-Napolitano Law of 1998 
and most recently, the Bossi-Fini Law of 2002 sought to 
balance competing objectives: the maintenance of law and 
order, the expansion of immigrants’ rights, and their eventual 
integration into Italian society (ibid, 153-160). The problem, 
however, was simply that there was no clear strategy for 
achieving these increasingly elusive goals. Of even greater 
                                                 
7  In some ways, the law was reminiscent of the Bracero program that 
restricted the number of temporary Mexican laborers who could work in the 
United States. 
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concern was the fact that as political polarization during the 
1990s and 2000s intensified and further weakened Italy’s 
already fragile coalition governments, the number of 
immigrants entering Italy grew at rapidly escalating rates. 
Official data from the National Statistical Office (ISTAT) 
showed “more than 1.3 million permit holders at the end of 
2002, and 1.7 million at the end of 2003, 2.1 million in 2004, 
2.3 million in 2005, 2.6 million in 2006, 3.1 million in 2007, 
3.9 million in 2008” (ibid, 150). Compared to 1970, this 
represents a nearly 27-fold increase! When I asked my 
respondents why they chose Italy as their destination, several of 
them immediately cited Italy’s lax immigration policies. 
Initially, some tried to join relatives in France and Germany 
while others had hoped to settle in the Netherlands; however, 
strict immigration procedures in those countries made it nearly 
impossible for them to secure permanent residence. A running 
joke among Chinese migrants is that all one needs to do is wait 
five years or so for the Italian government to announce one of 
its periodic regularizations (santoria) and residency in Italy 
could be attained. 8  Several respondents admitted that while 
Italy was not their top choice, securing residency there 
nevertheless had its advantages. They could travel freely and 
visit family and friends living elsewhere in the European 
Union; they also enjoyed and benefited from Italy’s generous 
social welfare policies, especially health care, in ways that 
Chinese migrants elsewhere in Europe could not. As Kitty 
Calavita has noted, this is how “Italy became a ‘back door’ to 
the rest of Europe…[and] an alternative to northern 
destinations”(Calavita, 2004: 347). This failure to devise a 
                                                 
8 They were not off the mark. “Italy promoted regularizations (regardless of 
the composition of the ruling coalition) in 1977, 1982, 1986, 1990, 1995, 
1998 and 2002” (Allievi, 2010: 155). 
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national immigration policy, however, greatly strained local 
authorities who were now responsible for managing both 
community affairs and the influx of migrants. 
These major structural changes within Italy coincided with 
China’s dramatic reorientation that began in 1978 under the 
leadership of Deng Xiaoping. Seeking to revitalize a stagnant 
economy, the Chinese party-state gradually dismantled Maoist 
policies and encouraged private enterprise and more market-
based activity. With the de-collectivization of agriculture and 
the acceleration of the economic boom, villagers, especially 
those in the interior regions of the country, circumvented the 
household registration (hukou) system, a structure of controls 
imposed during the Maoist period to prevent rural-urban 
migration, and took on the most arduous factory and 
construction jobs in the country’s major metropolises. They 
became a “floating population” (liudong renkou) (Ceccagno, 
2007; Solinger, 1999) temporary sojourners numbering in the 
tens of millions, who were critical in transforming China into 
the world’s leading industrial workshop. Despite suffering from 
pervasive discrimination and exploitation during their time in 
the cities, many migrants returned to their homes with new 
skills and perspectives and some hard earned money to start 
businesses of their own, heightening the prospects for change in 
their hometowns. 
In the international arena, a more open and cooperative stance 
emerged in tandem with the swing in domestic policies. 
Recognizing that China could not modernize its economy 
without foreign assistance, government officials encouraged 
more foreign investment, joint venture projects, and 
engagement with the outside world. While this produced new 
partnerships with major corporations like Volkswagen and 
General Electric, this policy shift also aimed to reengage 
Chinese Diaspora communities worldwide. Historically, 
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overseas Chinese have served as a crucial provider of startup 
capital for ventures back home and a valuable connection and 
resource for relatives and friends seeking to follow in their 
footsteps. It is under these circumstances that the residents of 
Zhejiang’s Wenzhou region became part of the first wave of 
Chinese to move beyond China’s borders and into Italy. But 
why were the Wenzhounese in particular better positioned to do 
so in comparison to residents of other areas?. 
Several factors stand out. First, unlike other famous migrant-
exporting areas like Guangdong (the home of Cantonese 
migrants) and Fujian, Wenzhou benefited from its historic ties 
to Europe, which date back to the late nineteenth century. It is 
worth quoting the historian Philip Kuhn (2008: 336) at length 
here: 
Europe (host today to a burgeoning Wenzhounese population) first 
attracted immigrants from nearby Qingtian county in a hardscrabble 
border area up the Ou River from Wenzhou city. Qingtian, Though 
mountainous and dirt poor, boasted one salable resource – an attractive 
pale-green soapstone that local artisans carved into decorative shapes. 
These carvings reportedly were first sold as curios to foreigners in China 
in the 1880s by a Qingting man. Having discovered their market value, 
he and other sculptors (the story goes) boarded a steamer to France in 
1893, which was the beginning of Wenzhou-area emigration to Europe. 
The ensuing outflow, sparked by fabulous stories about quick riches 
(including one in which a Qingtian emigrant presented a carving to the 
Dutch Queen), provided the bridgehead for a surge of Wenzhou-to-
Europe migration after World War II. 
Not surprisingly, “out of a population of about 6.9 million 
(1994), Wenzhou municipality recorded 165,000 as living in 
Europe, 95% in France, Holland, Italy, and Spain” (ibid, 336) 
Wenzhou residents had a support network of fellow natives 
(tongxiang) who were established and ready to assist them with 
settling into the new venue society. Others did not. They could 
“hit the ground running” so to speak after completing the long 
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and often treacherous journey from China to Italy, which usually 
involved taking the overland route through Russia and Eastern 
Europe.9 
What perhaps most distinguishes the Wenzhounese from 
compatriots with similar backgrounds though is their extensive 
history as entrepreneurs. Even prior to their arrival in Italy, the 
Wenzhounese were already known as some of China’s most 
formidable and pioneering business people. Their enterprising 
spirit was partly the outgrowth of Wenzhou’s longstanding 
ecological limitations (mountainous, comparatively inaccessible 
terrain and lack of resources), which led residents to seek out and 
collaborate with one another on a wide variety of commercial 
pursuits, including petty trade, umbrella and shoe production and 
cotton spinning, in order to survive. These experiences actually 
enhanced their familiarity with and dexterity in handling 
business-related challenges; it also strengthened the familial and 
social connections that they relied on for resources and support. 
Moreover, decades of isolation and state neglect during the 
Maoist period only reinforced notions that taking risks was 
critical to attaining financial security and success. In fact, much 
like entrepreneurs in California's Silicon Valley, the 
Wenzhounese are not averse to risk, but instead expect and 
welcome it. In fact, in my prior research on Wenzhou, I found 
that Wenzhou natives often feel embarrassed or ashamed if they 
do not put everything they have –their resources, reputation– on 
the line as they seek to fulfill their ambitions. This is what they 
expect of themselves and each other; this is a fundamental 
feature of the region’s social norms and culture. 
                                                 
9 Despite the potential dangers of riding the Trans-Siberian railroad, this 
was a popular route because it was relatively inexpensive and border 
controls were rather loose after the collapse of the Leninist regimes in the 
former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. 
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It is not surprising then that many admire them for their 
indomitable spirit of self-reliance and determination. One non-
Wenzhounese respondent offered this assessment: “Wenzhou 
people really stick together. They have really tight networks 
and can raise money quickly to help each other. If they want to 
start their own business, they just go to their families. There 
isn’t any need for formal documents; they have their ways of 
making things work out.”10 Others, however, note that, on the 
flip side, such attitudes and behavior often lead to an intense 
obsession with materialism. One Chinese female respondent 
whose ex-partner is a Wenzhounese put it this way: 
The Wenzhounese only care about money. If their kids aren't keeping up 
in school, they just pull them out. Some of these kids are as young as 10 
years old. They just go to work in the factories with their parents. All 
they think about is earning a little more. They don't care about other 
things like music. They don't believe that playing the piano is valuable in 
any way.11 
Italians are also divided on this issue. On the one hand, they 
respect Chinese industriousness but on the other, they wonder 
whether the laser-like focus on work is necessary or desirable. 
As one middle-aged Italian male states, “The Italians see the 
Chinese as very hardworking [his original term was 
“laborious”] people but they keep to themselves, they are in 
their own world. They work 16 hours a day –it’s too much but 
at least they work.”12 Another young Italian woman in her 20s, 
a language teacher whose classes are filled entirely with 
Chinese students, adds: “I have to be frank: the Wenzhounese I 
have encountered here [in Prato] are only interested in money. 
                                                 
10 Respondent #6, personal interview, Prato, Italy, July 18, 2007. 
11 Respondent #14, personal interview, Prato, Italy, July 26, 2007. 
12 Respondent #9, personal interview, Prato, Italy, July 22, 2007. 
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Outside of classes, they say they watch TV and play video 
games at home. It is a bit depressing –what is life then?.”13 
Unfortunately, for just about all Chinese migrants, not just the 
Wenzhounese, the stark reality is that they have no choice but to 
work hard, at least in the short term. Despite the major policy 
changes in Italy and China mentioned earlier, actually getting 
into Italy remains difficult and expensive, forcing some migrants 
to use subterfuge and more extreme, illegal methods to secure 
entry. One respondent, a female Wenzhounese business owner, 
recounts the lengths she went to secure passage to Italy: 
I came to Italy ten years ago [1997] and getting out was hard. There are 
so many of us from Wenzhou all trying to leave that government offices 
would reject our applications once they saw that we were from Zhejiang. 
So the snakeheads (shetou) had us change our pictures and reapply as 
Hunan natives. The Hunanese don't have a reputation for illegal 
migration so it worked.14 
For the majority of Chinese in Italy, the massive sums they 
were often forced to pay in order to migrate locked them into 
the worst of circumstances. A Prato comune official told me 
how he sees the situation: 
There really isn't a workable migration process. The Chinese go to 
Russia, then Austria, and then Italy. They pay €20,000-25,000 to come 
and their families serve as guarantors. When they arrive, they begin to 
repay their debts at a rate of €500 per month. They must work 12 hours 
per day from 10-1 than 3-12 a.m. they are bonded servants for three 
years. The government can't sue because it's technically a contract. I'm 
sorry to start with such a dark picture but it's important for me to get this 
out at the beginning [of the interview]. There were investigations done 
on work conditions. For three years these workers have no contact with 
                                                 
13 Respondent #41, personal interview, Prato, Italy, July 13, 2010. 
14 Respondent #16, personal interview, Prato, Italy, July 27, 2007. 
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the local community. Their only concerns are eating, sleeping, and 
staying healthy and they only stay within the [Chinese] community.15 
Understandably, many are outraged by these dire circumstances, 
including the migrants themselves. Nonetheless, this situation 
persists because the Chinese have few viable alternatives and the 
structural deficiencies of the process have not been remedied. 
Like migrants elsewhere, the first generation Chinese migrant is 
resigned to sacrificing her own dreams so that her children have 
a greater chance of fulfilling theirs. The female business owner 
cited earlier maintains that “this is a tough life [running a factory 
in Italy]. I want my kids to get an education, to stay in school. I 
don't want my kids to start another factory like this one. That's 
not what I came here to do.” 16  For her and many of her 
compatriots, working hard is the best and perhaps only means of 
moving beyond a fragile existence. 
Taken together, these macro level variables laid the foundation 
for a dramatic remaking of local level dynamics. Although the 
timing of these shifts was coincidental, they nevertheless 
created an unprecedented opening for a particular group of 
Chinese, the Wenzhounese, to find their way to Italy and apply 
their unique business talents to the textiles-apparel sector and 
communities in need of revitalization. Decades of isolation, 
state neglect, and plain bad luck paradoxically propelled them 
to develop alternative strategies of survival that were vital to 
their eventual success. Like the Jewish immigrants who arrived 
in America in the late nineteen and early twentieth centuries, 
the Chinese who went to Italy were not daunted by the 
                                                 
15 Respondent #36, personal interview, Prato, June 26, 2008. 
16 Respondent #16, personal interview, Prato, Italy, July 27, 2007. 
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challenges awaiting them, but charged ahead and tackled them 
with fierce determination.17 
Textiles and Tensions in Prato and Beyond 
Prato is Italy’s historic textile hub and home to one of the largest, 
if not the largest, Chinese communities in Italy. Estimates on the 
size of the community, however, range widely: the commune of 
Prato claims that Chinese with legal residence status number 
approximately 10,000, but informal accounts suggest the total 
number of Chinese ranges from 20,000 to 40,000 (including 
those who are undocumented) out of an aggregate 180,000 for 
the entire city. Based on these numbers, the Chinese would 
constitute eleven to sixteen percent of the city’s population. Most 
of the Chinese in Prato work in the textiles-apparel and leather 
goods sectors, which have simultaneously taken full advantage 
of the low wage labor provided by the Chinese while supplying 
those same workers with employment and skill development. 
Indeed, these early apprenticeships provided them with valuable 
experience and insights into these industries, which they later 
used to launch their own companies. 
In addition, comparatively permissive local policies regarding 
migrants, partly born of local political rivalries, made it easier for 
the Chinese to settle in Prato. A Chinese respondent, a male 
college student, part-time cultural mediator, and ten-year resident 
of the city, recounts the situation in the following manner: 
Prato encouraged the Chinese to settle here. One of the reasons had to do 
with the city's desire to become independent of Florence. Before, Prato 
                                                 
17  On the success of Jewish immigrants in New York, see Malcolm 
Gladwell, “The Three Lessons of Joe Flom” in Gladwell, Outliers: The 
Story of Success (New York: Little, Brown, and Company, 2008), 116-158. 
On Jewish immigrants in New York’s garment industry, see 142-151. 
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was under the jurisdiction of Florence. In order to become independent, 
it had to reach municipality status, which requires a population of 
180,000. The city loosened laws so that Chinese owners could have 
workers live on factory premises [and thus, increase the resident 
population].18 
Another Chinese gentlemen in his 40s who currently serves as a 
Chinese business association representative and has lived in 
Italy since 1998, echoes this point as well, emphasizing that 
Italians initially welcomed the Chinese to achieve their own 
political objectives: 
[The] Pratesi need to remember that in order for the city to become 
independent of Florence, it needed a population of 170,000 [or 180,000. 
It’s unclear which is correct]. The Chinese came because they could 
register their workplace as their residence. But two years ago [2008], the 
government ended this policy. Yet without it, Prato would still be a part 
of Florence.19 
Word spread quickly among Wenzhounese networks that Prato 
was an attractive destination. He continues: 
There are very few big companies in the area with 50 or more 
employees. Companies in Prato are typically small family-run businesses 
and this was attractive to the Chinese as well. Italy fits right in with 
Chinese family business practices and preferences…You have to think, 
why didn't Chinese people go to Pistoia and Arrezo?20 
A Chinese newspaper editor concurs: “Their [Wenzhounese] 
small, family-based businesses are actually a great fit for the 
                                                 
18  Respondent #38, personal interview, Campi Bisenzio, Italy, June 27, 
2008. It is important to point out that even in the 1960s and 1970s, Italian 
workers often lived in the factories in which they worked. Despite 
regulations banning such arrangements, local enforcement of these 
stipulations was lax. 
19 Respondent #10, personal interview, Prato, Italy, July 23, 2010. 
20 Respondent #38, personal interview, Campi Bisenzio, Italy, June 27, 2008. 
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production structure of the Italian economy. Its small scale and 
batch oriented production allows them to survive without large 
capital investment.”21 For example, one respondent, a Jiangsu 
native in his 50s who owns a small firm on the outskirts of 
Milan, told me that his sewing machines cost €1,300 each (I 
counted seven in his workshop) and rent was €1,400 per 
month.22 To him, these costs were not prohibitive at all. As 
another Wenzhounese working in a purse factory put it: “It's 
not too hard to start a company here if you work for a few years 
and save some money – you can borrow the rest from relatives. 
With €50,000, you can be your own boss.” 23  Indeed, once 
Chinese migrants had settled in Prato, kith and kin were crucial 
in helping them understand and meet business requirements. 
Thus, even though few, if any, of the migrants possessed 
extensive prior knowledge of Italy in general and Prato in 
particular, many did feel a gut level familiarity or resonance 
with their new environment. They felt comfortable. 
Still, the textiles-apparel industry remains a tough and 
competitive enterprise. Although the Chinese are now engaged 
in nearly every aspect of the industry, from fabric dyeing and 
printing to even fashion design, the majority of Chinese firms 
remain engaged in the nitty-gritty production of clothes. Most 
notably, they are closely associated with a specific niche of the 
broader market, pronto moda. Pronto moda or “ready to wear” 
garments epitomize what is fashionable, what’s “hot” to a 
                                                 
21 Respondent #6, personal interview, Prato, Italy, July 17, 2007. 
22 Respondent #22, personal interview, Milan, Italy, June 14, 2008. 
23 Respondent # 21, personal interview, Prato, Italy, July 29, 2007. 
18 Calvin Chen 
Inter Asia Papers ISSN 2013-1747 nº 20/2011 
largely twenty-something crowd.24 To them, what's hot at any 
given moment is shaped by, among other things, variations in 
fabric, color, pattern, and cut and in many cases, departures 
from the more mainstream look promoted by retail chain stores. 
While relatives and associates are attuned to trends and provide 
valuable market analysis (Chinese social networks encompass 
all of Italy and other parts of Europe like Spain), the 
unpredictability of popular tastes nevertheless prevents these 
companies from making mass quantities of a specific item. 
Also, given the short turnaround time demanded by clients, the 
situation becomes fraught with stress, as one Chinese textiles 
enterprise owner explains: 
It's really hard to work with Chinese customers [who order pronto moda 
garments]. Sometimes they will come to us with a design and ask us to 
make a sample. I usually make it myself especially if it might result in a 
large order because I don't trust the workers to be very careful with such 
an important task. The problem is that the customer comes in during the 
afternoon and if they like the sample, they want the order filled the next 
morning or within two days. Although they often only want one to 40-60 
pieces total, the deadline is very tight. Italian companies are a bit better. 
They tell us what they want two months in advance but they also are 
stricter about quality.25 
A female Wenzhounese who had recently moved to Prato after 
selling her factory in Naples stresses similar points: 
We used to own an apparel company in Naples. Chinese own many 
apparel factories there: mine made children’s clothing [woolen jackets]. 
But it was hard to stay in business and hard for workers too. Owners had 
many burdens – it wasn’t easy. We took orders from Italian companies 
                                                 
24 Pronto moda garments are typically less expensive than clothes sold in 
retail stores and thus, especially attractive to consumers with more limited 
incomes. 
25 Respondent #15, personal interview, Prato, Italy, July 28, 2007. 
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but didn’t do much work for Chinese clients. Chinese customers would 
usually come in asking for 100 pieces of something and if we took that 
order, we’d have to work through the night so that the goods could be 
shipped the next morning. It was too grueling so we stopped doing that 
kind of work.26 
While pronto moda’s emphasis on small batch production 
involves less overall financial risk for these family-based 
companies, it also limits their opportunities for growth. Their 
“hotness” aside, the reality is that pronto moda garments 
simply do not command the high prices and high profit margins 
typically associated with designer label apparel. Making 
matters worse is fierce competition from new firms eager to 
secure just a small slice of the market.27 In 2007, I visited a 
small textile operation in Prato, just off Via Pistoiese, and the 
owner, a man in his late 20s and a native of Qingtian, offered 
the following assessment with some frustration: 
It's really getting competitive. When a customer asks for a quote, I might 
say €4 per piece. But someone else will come along and drop it to €3.80 
and another will drop it even further to €3.60. Sometimes they are not 
making any profit whatsoever. They are breaking even but hoping to get 
more contracts in the future. I don't care if I lose a contract – maybe your 
quality is better or you have a longstanding relationship with a client. 
That's fine. But the pricing should all be the same. No one can make any 
Money this way. Chinese are always fighting themselves.28 
In 2010, the situation was even worse. Another owner, a male 
Wenzhounese in his 50s who has been in Italy since 1990, was 
especially agitated when discussing the challenges he faces: 
                                                 
26 Respondent #55, personal interview, Prato, Italy, July 26, 2010. 
27 Observers estimate that there are between 4,000-7,000 small enterprises 
in Prato, including those that are not officially registered. 
28 Respondent #17, personal interview, Prato, Italy, July 28, 2007. 
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Chinese competition is crazy. I don’t take orders where the profits are 
lower than €1.5 per piece. Take this coat, for example. I would charge 
€10-11 but another competitor is offering to do it for €6.9. The material 
already costs €3; I outsource the button sewing – that’s €2, then you have 
to sew and ship and there are utility costs as well. It’s outrageous that 
some folks will do the work for €0.1 per piece!.29 
In addition to low pricing, these firms have to contend with 
slow-paying and even latepayingclients. Pinched for cash 
themselves, the customers buy largely on credit and promise to 
settle their outstanding debts once the merchandise has been 
completely sold off. The danger of course is that the products 
may fizzle in the market and result in losses, further tightening 
already strained finances. The Chinese owner from Jiangsu 
cited earlier worries about how long he can hold out, especially 
with seven employees under his charge: 
I have one really good friend who borrowed money from another friend 
to loan to me because I had €80,000 in unpaid work orders! It was scary. 
Last year [2007] it took my customers eight months to pay me. 
Normally, businesses are supposed to pay within three months. But 
[some of my Italian customers] held the money for much longer – they 
say they can't pay until their customers have paid them. But right now, I 
owe €10,000 in back pay – it's making me nervous. It's been four months 
since my clients have paidme.30 
Without steady cash flow, these companies are understandably 
reluctant to expand their operations and acquire better, more 
expensive machinery. To alleviate these pressures, some have 
adapted by moving up the production chain, shifting away from 
low-end items and more towards expensive goods like those of 
Giorgio Armani and Dolce & Gabbana. A young Chinese leathers 
goods seller describes the situation in the following terms: 
                                                 
29 Respondent #44, personal interview, Prato, Italy, July 18, 2010. 
30 Respondent #22, personal interview, Milan, Italy, June 14, 2008. 
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My cousin owns a factory [near Milan] that makes purses for Dolce & 
Gabbana. They sell the products for approximately €100 each to Dolce 
& Gabbana, but Dolce & Gabbana sells the bags for over €1000 each. 
They have higher rents and overall cost to be sure, but people are willing 
to pay because they want the brand. It’s true they have very high and 
exacting standards. They want better zippers and metal rings, for 
example. And because it’s Dolce & Gabbana, the Chinese workers are 
more careful. With the merchandise we sell, they don’t need to be as 
rigorous. Chinese workers are smart: they don’t need to pay quite as 
much attention to these goods because the profits are so low.31 
Such moves certainly involve a good measure of risk, but it is 
precisely this nimbleness and willingness to make rapid 
strategic shifts that sets Chinese businesses apart and more 
importantly, keeps them afloat. 
Given these intense pressures, one might reasonably expect these 
factories to have horrid work conditions. Many did and some 
still do; dark and dingy workshops were especially 
commonplace during the 1990s when scores of these firms were 
first launched. However, I was surprised that workplace 
conditions, at least in the factories I visited in 2007, 2008, and 
2010, were much better than I had anticipated. Having read 
earlier depictions of Chinese firms in Italy, particularly those in 
the popular media, I expected to see scenes from a Charles 
Dickens novel. Instead, these firms had established simple, 
clean, and efficient operations. Although the overall workspace 
was cramped, the layout was orderly and reflected a clear 
division of labor. In just about all of the enterprises, one would 
walk into the middle of the factory and find numerous mounds of 
fabric laid out for processing. The work process begins with a 
massive, rectangular table, where workers cut the cloth into the 
various parts of a shirt, for example. These components are then 
                                                 
31 Respondent #73, personal interview, Venice, Italy, August 4, 2010. 
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moved along the perimeter of the factory, literally along the four 
walls, to individual sewing stations for processing by workers 
“downstream.” Each employee focuses on a single task like 
attaching the sleeves or collar and then passes the item to the 
next employee. After the sewing is complete, other employees 
take on hemming and buttoning. Finally, the remaining workers 
iron and/or package the finished apparel in preparation for 
shipping. The complexity of the task as well as the individual’s 
skill determines where the worker is stationed. Sequencing the 
various tasks from simple to complex not only makes it easier 
for employees to see and remember work routines and 
procedures, but also alleviates potential production bottlenecks. 
Even within small-scale, family-based operations, assembly line 
techniques enhanced efficiency and overall productivity. 
Despite these positives, work is nevertheless grueling. A typical 
workday can last more than ten hours and involve the 
completion of 1,000-2,000 pieces during that span. In contrast 
to the more conventional 9-5 regimen, employees in textiles-
apparel firms “start work in the afternoon and [continue] 
through the night, finishing around 3-4 a.m. Workers sleep 
from around 7 a.m. to 3 p.m.” They also take several breaks for 
meals from 3-4 p.m., 7-8 p.m., 10-11 p.m., and 2-3 a.m. 32 
Seeking to capitalize on fast-changing trends, these factories 
have little alternative but to operate through the night so as to 
meet early morning pickup/delivery times. One consequence, as 
a worker at a synthetic fabric company succinctly and wryly 
noted, is that “Italians work eight hours per day [while] the 
Chinese only rest eight hours per day.”33 The irony is that the 
                                                 
32 Respondent #15, personal interview, Prato, Italy, July 28, 2007. 
33 Respondent #19, personal interview, Prato, Italy, July 2007. 
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Chinese today are how the Italians used to be, according to a 
retired Italian academic: 
We Italians used to work 12-14 hours per day as well. Just 20 years ago, 
I remember my father asking my mother’s uncle how much he earned. 
The uncle said, “500,000 lire.” My father said he earned twice that by 
working 12 hours per day. Italians also wanted to drive a Mercedes! The 
Chinese learned from us, especially how to engage in “black work” 
[uninsured, informal, undocumented work].34 
Although workers earn an average of €800-1,100 per month with 
have room and board covered by the factory, burnout and 
quitting after a year or two of employment is normal. However, 
most workers will just “suck it up” because they need their 
employers to secure residency.35 There was a note of resignation 
in the voice of one owner when we talked about the daily grind: 
It's not a very consistent way to live – there's no predictability or 
regularity in our lives. It just depends on the work orders. The longest 
I've worked was 40 hours without sleeping. When we’re not working, 
we’re either eating or sleeping. There's nothing else.36 
A former business owner was glad to be out of the industry 
because “sometimes I would work for a couple of days straight 
without sleeping. It got so bad that I would vomit from being so 
tired.”37 Indeed, on all of my visits, I saw employees who were 
absolutely focused on the tasks at hand. On one, maybe two 
occasions, I heard workers engage in some light banter or small 
talk, but it was done in passing when, for instance, picking up 
                                                 
34 Respondent #51, personal interview, Prato, Italy, July 22, 2010. 
35 Respondent #10, personal interview, Prato, Italy, July 25, 2007. 
36 Respondent #15, personal interview, Prato, Italy, July 28, 2007. 
37 Respondent #14, personal interview, Prato, Italy, July 26, 2007. 
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more materials from a storage area. All of them returned to and 
approached their jobs with the utmost seriousness. 
Authority relations within the factory mirrored the constraints 
and challenges posed by the work process. Compared to most 
other companies, the command structure in apparel companies 
is relatively simple, consisting of a simple hierarchy with the 
owner on top and his employees below. These are not multi-
divisional firms that require bureaucratic coordination but 
rather small companies where intensive personal contact is the 
norm (Edwards, 1977: 23-26). Problems are tackled through 
direct consultation and action rather than standard operating 
procedures and fines. Owners recognize that survival depends 
heavily on teamwork and stability and that overzealous 
monitoring of work performance is not only unnecessary, but 
also potentially counterproductive. Since each worker is 
assigned a quota, she can measure her productivity by the size 
of her pile of fabric in relation to a coworker's. The more a 
worker falls behind, the longer she must stay before she can 
end her shift. Because of this, self-monitoring is the primary 
means of guiding work performance. Should that fail, the 
owner is usually on the shop floor as well and only needs to 
point to the pile to goad employees into working faster. All of 
this is reminiscent of the earliest stage of enterprise 
development in China’s rural enterprises, what I have called 
elsewhere “enterprise survival” (Chen, 2008: ch. 3). What is 
significant here is not simply the transfer of abusiness approach 
from China to Italy, but rather its resonance and utility in a 
foreign institutional environment. These developments suggest 
that critical structural features – the irregular and rushed nature 
of work orders, erratic cash flow, and shifting client base, 
among other factors – decisively shape the scale and scope of 
textiles-apparel operations. While some companies have made 
decisive breakthroughs and moved beyond these limitations, 
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the vast majority continues to follow this model. In many ways, 
the Chinese way of doing business paralleled the Italian one. 
While this portrait of work life in a Chinese apparel company 
appears bleak, there are nevertheless moments of great 
liveliness and vibrancy. The desperation and monotony that 
workers experience are tempered to some degree by a sense of 
community built upon common experiences and even 
horseplay. On one of my visits to a Prato textiles factory in July 
2007, I was invited to have dinner with the owner and ten 
employees at 10:30 p.m. We gathered around a large table and 
consumed in less than 30 minutes, eight, maybe nine dishes, 
soup, and sliced fruit for dessert. At this time, the seemingly 
silent, robotic workers were full of life and laughter. A few 
employees teased a coworker about her boyfriend: she smiled 
nervously and avoided eye contact. Some joked about how lazy 
others could be on their day off, sleeping in or lounging around 
when they could be going out and having fun. Much to my 
surprise, the owner was a target of the conversation as well. 
Employees pretended to be irate over the bad food and the 
luxurious lifestyle he led at their expense. A jovial fellow, he 
took their mock attacks goodnaturedly, pointing out how 
spoiled and indulgent they are, just like small children. He then 
cleverly shifted the conversation back to the subject of the 
employee’s boyfriend before they cleaned up and prepared to 
return to work. The experience was like eating with a large 
family with all the attendant chaos, ribbing, and camaraderie. 
Still, fun and games could not and did not make up for 
perceived abuses and inequities. The trying financial pressures 
owners faced every day forced most of them into “penny-
pinching mode”: they kept a close eye on all costs and sought 
to slash every unnecessary amenity. One former worker now 
turned apparel salesman was especially delighted to no longer 
be on the shop floor. His recounting was especially bitter: 
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Owners are often really cheap. In one place I worked, there were only a 
couple of electrical outlets and a couple of lights! There wasn't even a 
light in the workers’ rooms. It was completely dark. So when the boss 
went to sleep, we did too. It was like being in the military. We had to 
take turns charging our cell phones! 
Another factory only had one electrical fan. The boss only turned it on 
when we sat down for meals. How can anyone stand it when it's this hot? 
He was trying to save money on his electrical bill. He also tried to save 
money by telling workers to cook their own meals. He only thought 
about the lower bill for groceries but what about the gas bill and all the 
time we spend around the stove?38 
This obsession with the bottom line, as understandable as it is, 
produces unanticipated and counterproductive consequences. 
Rather than enhance workplace stability, it actually undermines 
morale and prompts some employees to be more suspicious of 
their bosses rather than more trusting. One young male worker in 
a purse factory expresses his dismay in the following manner: 
It's hard to rely on friends and family now. Every person has become 
very practical and just focuses on his own affairs. It's more like how 
Westerners think. Some people will still treat you like a brother, but once 
you work for a friend, you're a worker and his employee.39 
He stated further that a loss of renqing (literally “human 
feeling”) or empathy made work an even heavier burden. It 
greatly undercut the sense of common purpose and camaraderie 
that once infused the workplace community. 
Finally, besides market competition and fractured interests 
within factories, one must recognize the significance of the 
state in determining the fate of Chinese business in Italy. 
Through inspections and fines, state officials are the ultimate 
                                                 
38 Respondent #20, personal interview, Prato, Italy, July 29, 2007. 
39 Respondent #21, personal interview, Prato, Italy, July 29, 2007. 
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arbiters of a company's existence and their power has spawned 
different coping strategies among the Chinese, especially in 
light of the government’s inconsistent enforcement of its own 
policies. The most typical response is ignorance. Many claim 
that, because of their short time in Italy, limited communication 
skills, and subsequent unfamiliarity with business regulations, 
they are just beginning to learn about the myriad requirements 
they must fulfill. Over time, however, this excuse becomes 
untenable. Low profit margins and the threat of heavy financial 
penalties have forced more and more to seek ways around the 
law. What is particularly astonishing though is the widespread 
assessment of the Chinese (and many Italians as well) that full 
compliance would lead to bankruptcy, not prosperity. Indeed, 
following the letter and spirit of the laws is foolhardy and leads 
to one's eventual demise. 
Nearly every Chinese migrant I spoke with sees Italian officials 
as generally corrupt, unfair, and biased. To them, using bribery, 
evasion, and other “weapons of the weak” to subvert their 
authority is not only vital to survival, but also a means of 
overcoming what they perceive to be grave injustices built into 
the Italian legal system itself (Scott, 1985). One female 
respondent was extraordinarily open about how she dealt with 
inspectors: “Each year we bought those big hams [prosciutto] 
and gave them to the police and inspectors. When they came 
for inspections, everything would go smoothly.” 40  A 
Wenzhounese woman who owns a women’s clothing store on 
Via Paolo Sarpi in Milan was disgusted by the brazenness of 
the police: 
The police here are really corrupt. They know that the Chinese have lots 
of money, lots of cash. With the new security law, it’s easy for them to 
                                                 
40 Respondent #14, personal interview, Prato, Italy, July 26, 2007. 
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stop people and check their IDs. When they see that the Chinese have so 
much cash on them, they take us to the police station. There, they 
threaten to report us for tax evasion and then demand a bribe to keep 
quiet. They want €5,000 but my friends talked them down to €2,000.41 
When paying taxes becomes unavoidable, some resort to 
counterfeit tax receipts as a way of coping with crippling 
expropriations, as was the case with this business owner in Milan: 
Typically, you have to make profits within 3-5 years of operation. The 
taxes are just too high. It's not that the business is complicated: it's 
actually quite simple. If the Business tax is 20%, no one can survive. 
You have to cheat to get it down to 10%. We often resort to buying fake 
tax receipts for €400 per book. If we didn't do this, the Italians would 
think we are stupid -- even they have to cheat to stay in business!42 
Nearly every Chinese respondent I interviewed either experienced 
something similar or knewsomeone who did. Although such 
incidents are not entirely alien to them (Chinese officials can be 
equally, if not more oppressive), Chinese migrants feel Italian 
officials are targeting them and taking unfair advantage of their 
vulnerabilities simply because of who they are.  
Such sentiments were manifest in early 2008 when the 
Berlusconi government began arresting and repatriating illegal 
immigrants in the name of “security.” These actions sent shock 
waves throughout Italy and the Chinese community became 
especially apprehensive. The operation against Via Paolo Sarpi 
in Milan (where Chinese businesses are concentrated) took on a 
decidedly military tone, according to one respondent: 
When the police came to sweep, they blocked the front of the street and 
the side streets so there was no escape when the inspectors came up the 
                                                 
41 Respondent #25, personal interview, Milan, Italy, June 18, 2008. 
42 Respondent #22, personal interview, Milan, Italy, June 14, 2008. 
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rear. They've reportedly caught 127 illegals in one day as they went 
through each business checking people's papers. Some illegals have 
already been sent back to Shandong [a province in China] -- they were 
fined 10,000 yuan and then charged another 10,000 for the air ticket. The 
fine is just bad luck -it was the result of being in the wrong place at the 
wrong time. But no one feels good about paying the ticket price: it's just 
money down the drain! We know all this because they [those who were 
sent back] called their relatives here to let them know they are safe.43 
Fear and outrage intensified among the Chinese in Prato when 
Italian authorities, essentially put Via Pistoiese in lockdown 
and brought in military units to help patrol the streets on foot 
and from above by helicopter in early 2010. While local 
authorities were determined to restore public order in the 
aftermath of violence and murders in the area, they also failed 
to mention crucial details. A Chinese man, an interpreter and 
cultural mediator who has lived in Prato since 1992, explains 
the situation: 
I actually know something about this [murders]. It was a turf war 
between rival gangs [bangpai]. They were fighting each other to protect 
their territory and it was related to drugs. But it was Chinese fighting 
Chinese. It did not involve the Italian Mafia at all. The Chinese don’t 
target Italians; instead, the Chinese rob other Chinese. They go after 
others in the community. It’s clear why this is happening. With more 
Chinese here, it’s harder to survive. People are engaging in riskier, more 
dangerous behavior – it’s related to economic problems.44 
The government crackdown, however, continued and extended 
to Chinese-owned businesses. As was the case in Milan, 
government units cited a vast array of violations as justification 
for their actions. Unlike past efforts, this current campaign has 
been more sustained and brutal. The interpreter offers an 
insider’s perspective: 
                                                 
43 Respondent #22, personal interview, Milan, Italy, June 14, 2008. 
44 Respondent #43, personal interview, Prato, Italy, July 19, 2010. 
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I’ve served as an interpreter 5-10 times for government inspection teams. 
They go out and check compliance with sanitation, building codes, work 
conditions, employment of undocumented workers. They don’t tell you 
anything before they move out: they don’t allow me to bring anything or 
drive my own car. I have to ride with them. The teams are more 
aggressive now. The inspectors used to be very polite and knock on the 
door before entering. Now they have the fire department come in and 
break the door down without knocking or alerting anyone. They use a 
special tool to do this. It’s very extreme.45 
Reactions to the inspections turned out to be more mixed than I 
had expected. Many Chinese actually agreed with the 
government that there should be greater compliance with the 
law: what they did not appreciate though was the complete 
shutdown of their operations and not having the opportunity to 
make proper amends for their behavior. To them, the 
government’s efforts were grossly disproportionate to the threat 
posed by Chinese business people and will ultimately prove 
counterproductive. While some Italian observers advocated 
even more extreme measures like repatriating the Chinese 
altogether, I was surprised that many native Italians were 
critical of the government and more supportive of the 
Chinese. 46  One young Italian college student vehemently 
claims that it is the Italians who are more responsible for the 
crisis: “People always point out that migrants cheat, don’t 
follow the laws, but it’s the Italians who are even better at 
cheating. We know how to hide it better – it’s like a big scandal 
in the US, like Wall Street. We are like Bernie Madoff!”.47 
                                                 
45 Respondent #43, personal interview, Prato, Italy, July 19, 2010. 
46 Silvia Pieraccini takes a particularly hardline stance against the Chinese. 
See Pieraccini, L’Assedio Cinese (Milan: Gruppo24Ore, 2008). 
47 Respondent #45, personal interview, Prato, Italy, July 18, 2010. 
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By contrast, a Pratesi man in his mid-50s blames the Italian 
government: “The current immigration issues are the fault of 
Italians and the Italian government. If we had made clear rules 
for everyone to follow right at the beginning, relations between 
the Chinese and Italians would be much better.”48 An Italian 
woman in her mid-50s also echoes this point: “Although 
Italians blame the Chinese for breaking the laws, this result is 
our fault. We haven’t made clear what we want and how they 
should behave. If we were clear right from the beginning that 
any immigrant who wants to stay must do things the Italian 
way, the situation wouldn’t be as chaotic as it is now.” 49 
Amazingly, many of my Italian respondents pointed more to 
structural deficiencies, not cultural differences as the primary 
reason for friction between migrants and Italians. What this 
implies is that many of the current problems can be resolved 
through more effective policies (undoubtedly a big “if”), 
increased understanding, and greater tolerance. A high-ranking 
representative of a local school offers this sophisticated and 
thorough assessment: 
The political environment right now is not good for immigrants, but I 
think immigration is a positive phenomenon. The Pratesi are at fault for 
current attitudes. For years, the left did nothing so stereotypes flourished. 
People still believe that the Chinese are stealing jobs. No one has done a 
serious analysis of the challenges posed by migration. Chinese migration 
took place during a crisis in Prato. The Chinese are being blamed for it, 
but no one realizes that it would have happened anyway. The analysis 
should have been about the economy before the arrival of the Chinese in 
order for us to understand the full picture. 
In my opinion, the Chinese involvement and role in the local economy 
will deepen and lead us to a new stage of development. The Chinese are 
                                                 
48 Respondent #54, personal interview, Prato, Italy, July 25, 2010. 
49 Respondent #47, personal interview, Prato, Italy, July 20, 2010. 
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investing here while Italians investí elsewhere. The Chinese are keeping 
Prato alive. I spoke with some Italian kids and they said their father’s 
work in a Chinese owned factory! Their bosses are Chinese. No one sees 
this. All they do is blame without understanding that Italians can work 
because of the Chinese.50 
Conclusion 
This article argues that an unusual confluence of macro-level 
forces ranging from demographic change in Italy’s population 
to the loosening of controls in post-Maoist China provided an 
unprecedented opportunity for the Chinese to migrate and settle 
in Italy. Once settled in locales like Prato, the Chinese and 
specifically, the Wenzhounese applied their unique talents and 
experiences towards reviving the textiles-apparel industry. The 
Chinese were not only in the right place at the right time, but 
also seemed in many ways, tailor-made for an industrial system 
that privileged small-batch, family-based production. 
Nevertheless, significant challenges remain. Low entry 
requirements or the relative ease of starting a business has 
resulted in the rapid proliferation of Chinese-owned enterprises. 
While this has provided employment for many Chinese 
migrants, it has also led to increased competition that not only 
constrains future growth, but also threatens their very survival. 
As a result, some Chinese businesspeople felt compelled to use 
tax evasion, bribery, and other means to cope with a highly 
turbulent situation. Not surprisingly, all of these developments 
contributed to official and popular backlash: the local 
government continues to enforce more hard-line policies in 
concert with strong anti-immigrant sentiment. 
                                                 
50 Respondent #52, personal interview, Prato, Italy, July 26, 2010. 
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However, even under these conditions, sprouts of change have 
emerged and contributing to Italy’s continued transformation. 
This change has already spread well beyond factories to all 
interstices of Italian life, from cafes to parks to neighborhoods, 
among ordinary people living in extraordinary times. Some are 
dismayed and fearful about a future that may well look 
radically different from the recent past. It will be one that 
includes the Chinese, who as a community certainly remain a 
work in progress. Their experience over the last thirty years 
does suggest though that in spite of the recent tensions, the 
Chinese will continue to adapt and play a positive role in an 
increasingly multiethnic and multicultural Italy. 
References 
Allievi, Stefano (2010) “Multiculturalism in Italy: the missing 
model”, in Alessandro Silj, ed., European Multiculturalism 
Revisited. London: Zed Books, pp. 147-180. 
Calavita, Kitty (2004) “Italy: Economic Realities, Political Fictions, 
and Policy Failures”, in Wayne Cornelius, Takeyuki Tsuda, Philip 
Martin, and James Hollifield, eds., Controlling Immigration: A 
Global Perspective. Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 55-82. 
Ceccagno, Antonella (2007) “Compressing Personal Time: 
Ethnicity and Gender within a Chinese Niche in Italy”. Journal of 
Ethnic and Migration Studies, 33 (4), pp. 635-654. 
Ceccagno, Antonella (2003) “New Chinese Migrants in Italy,” 
International Migration, 41 (3), pp. 187-213.   
Chen, Calvin (2008) Some Assembly Required Work,  Community, 
and Politics in China’s Rural Enterprises. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Asia Center. 
Demeny, Paul (2006) “Europe’s immigration challenge in 
demographic perspective”, in Craig Parsons and Timothy 
Smeeding, eds., Immigration and the Transformation of Europe. 
New York: Cambridge University Press, pp.30-42. 
34 Calvin Chen 
Inter Asia Papers ISSN 2013-1747 nº 20/2011 
Dinmore, Guy, “Tuscan Town Turns Against Chinese Migrants”, 
Financial Times, 8 February 2010. 
Edwards, Richard (1977) Contested Terrain: The Transformation of 
the Workplace in the Twentieth Century. NewYork: Basic Books. 
Geertz, Clifford (1973) The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected 
Essays. New York: Basic Books. 
Ginsborg, Paul (2006) Italy and Its Discontents: Family, Civil 
Society, State 1980-2001. New York: Palgrave. 
Gladwell, Malcolm (2008) Outliers: The Story of Success. New 
York: Little, Brown, and Company. 
Kuhn, Philip (2008) Chinese Among Others: Emigration in 
Modern Times. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. 
Locke, Richard (1995) Remaking the Italian Economy. Ithaca, 
New York: Cornell University Press. 
Pieraccini, Silvia (2008) L’Assedio Cinese. Milan: Gruppo24Ore. 
Piore, Michael and Sabel, Charles (1984) The Second Industrial 
Divide. New York: Basic Books. 
Putnam, Robert (2000) Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival 
of American Community. New York: Simon and Schuster. 
Putnam, Robert (1994) Making Democracy Work: Civic 
Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Rosenthal, Elizabeth, “Italy Arrests Hundreds of Immigrants”, 
New York Times, 16 May 2008. 
Saviano, Roberto (2007) Gomorrah, translated by Virginia Jewiss. 
New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux. 
Scott, James (1985) Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of 
Peasant Resistance. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Solinger, Dorothy (1999) Contesting Citizenship in Urban China: 
Peasant Migrants, the State, and the Logic of the Market. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
